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1947] NOTES
There is, however, at least one deviation from the general
rule that any affirmative defense might be urged through the ex-
ception of no cause of action. In the field of prescription, where
the courts are prohibited from supplying the plea,17 the defense
cannot be presented through the exception of no cause of action
but must be tendered by the exception of prescription.'
The principal case presents 'the first expression by the court
of a rule applicable to the assertion of affirmative defenses gen-
erally by means of the exception of no cause of action. Since this
rule requires an exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other
than the premise upon which the defense is based, it appears
that the decision affords proper protection of the plaintiff from
dismissal because of technical insufficiencies or surplusage. At
the same time it preserves the use of the exception of no cause
of action in those unusual cases where the petition definitely and
unequivocally establishes a factual basis for the defense.
I. HENRY SMITu
JURISDICTION RATIONE MATERIAE ET PERSONAE--SUITS AGAINST
INSOLVENT CORPORATIONS IN REcEiVERHIP-Under a code pro-
vision permitting real actions to be brought either at defendant's
lowed Levy on his reconventional demand, of $1675. Levy then brought suit
against Roos, the surety, for $1675 and was met by an exception of no cause
of action. The court, in sustaining the exception, pointed out that the record
of the previous suit was part of the plaintiff's petition and that, since com-
pensation takes place by mere operation of law, extinction of the debt by
compensation could be asserted by an exception of no cause of action.
16. Ackerman v. McShane, 43 La. Ann. 507, 9 So. 483 (1891), where the
defendant was the surviving partner of the firm of the deceased and under
a compromise agreement paid the plaintiff, the universal legatee, $20,000 in
full settlement of deceased's half of the partnership business. Later the
plaintiff brought suit, alleging the compromise and that the defendant frau-
dulently represented that her interest was worth $20,000 when actually it
was worth $29,000; and asked judgment for $9000. In sustaining the exception
of no cause of action, the court observed that the petition on its face showed
the compromise; and that the plaintiff could not ask that it be set aside for
fraud and at the same time retain the $20,000 paid.
In Brandon v. Gottlieb, 132 So. 283 (La. App. 1931), the plaintiff's peti-
tion alleged that his 14 year old son was killed through the gross negligence
of defendant's employee, an elevator operator; and that shortly thereafter
the defendant and his insurance agent induced the plaintiff to sign a docu-
ment called a "release" for which he was to receive a "gift" of $350. The
court overruled the defendant's exception of no cause of action, concluding
that the plaintiff was not asking for annulment of a compromise, but was
assuming rather that there was no such agreement.
17. Art 3463, La. Civil Code of 1870.
18. Succession of Thompson, 191 La. 480, 186 So. 1 (1938); White v. Davis,
169 La. 101, 124 So. 186 (1929).
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domicile or in the parish where the property is situated,' the
plaintiffs brought suit in St. Mary Parish to annul an oil and gas
lease affecting property in that parish. Both of the corporate
defendants previously had been adjudicated insolvent in receiv-
ership proceedings conducted in Orleans Parish. Neither defend-
ant excepted to the trial court's jurisdiction, one making no
appearance whatsoever and the other, through its receiver,
filing an answer which was in effect a general denial. Prior to
judgment, under proper authorization in the receivership pro-
ceedings, the lease involved was sold, and the purchaser inter-
vened in the St. Mary suit to resist the plaintiffs' demands. From
a judgment for plaintiffs, the intervener and both defendants
appealed, challenging the trial court's jurisdiction on the ground
that since the defendants were insolvent, under the pertinent
code provision,2 the suit could only have been instituted in
the receivership proceedings. Held, (1) the language of the code
provision invoked by appellants was mandatory and permitted
no exceptions thereto, and (2) that the lack of jurisdiction was
ratione materiae which could not be waived through failure to
object in limine. Bercegeay v. Techeland Oil Corporation, 209
La. 33, 24 So. (2d) 242 (1945).
Originally, the code provision relied on by the appellants
was an adjunct of the state insolvency procedure, requiring all
suits aganist an insolvent or his syndic to be transferred to or
brought in the court conducting the insolvency proceedings.8
Upon the adoption of the National Bankruptcy Act, this provision
might well have been deemed suspended, along with the other
statutory or code provisions relating to the cession of goods by
insolvents. Apparently, the continued efficacy of this code
provision was assumed necessary for the protection of receivers
1. "In actions for revendication of real property, . . . the defendant may
be cited . . . either within the jurisdiction where the property revendicated
... is situated... or in that where the defendant has his domicil, as plain-
tiff chooses .. " Art. 163, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La.
Act 64 of 1876.
2. "In all matters relative to failure, all the suits already commenced,
or which may be subsequently instituted against the debtor, must be carried
before the court in which the failure has been declared." Art. 165(3), La.
Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by La. Act 282 of 1940.
3. See Calder & Co. and Calder v. Their Creditors, 44 La. Ann. 454, 10 So.
930 (1892). See also Board of Missions, M. E. Church South v. C. D. Craig-
head Co., 130 La. 1076, 58 So. 888 (1912).
4. Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
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and creditors of insolvent corporations.5 Since under receivership
procedure, any interference with the receiver's administration
and possession of property is controlled through the requirement
that permission of the court conducting the receivership must
be obtained to sue the receiver in another court,' such an assump-
tion would appear unnecessary. As the latest Louisiana Supreme
Court cases have held a failure to obtain this prerequisite per-
mission to be a jurisdictional question,7 the result in the instant
case might be justified on this ground.8
In jurisdiction ratione personae' the Louisiana counterpart
of common law venue,10 the general rule in civil matters is that
a person must be sued at his domicile." Of necessity, exceptions
thereto are construed strictly. 2 In the Code of Practice of 1825,
the redactors followed a simple but definite pattern: the general
rule was enunciated in Article 162, the permissive exceptions
thereto were set forth in the following article, and the man-
datory exceptions to the general rule were embodied in Articles
164 and 165. Little opportunity for conflict between these ex-
ceptions was presented, as the latter were few in number and
each applied to well-defined situations. Since 1825, however, the
number of these exceptions to the general rule (the defendant
must be sued at his domicile) has increased steadily by amenda-
tory additions to Article 165, with little or no attention being
paid to the original pattern of the Code of Practice. Some of
5. See Board of Missions, M. E. Church South v. C. D. Craighead Co.,
130 La. 1076, 58 So. 888 (1912). See also In re Receivership of Cotton Queen
Oil Co., 143 La. 1, 78 So. 130 (1918).
6. Godchaux v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 151 La. 955, 92 So. 398 (1922); Stand-
ard Oil Co. v. Sugar Products Co., 160 La. 763, 107 So. 566 (1926).
7. Cases cited supra note 6. Contra: City of New Orleans v. New Or-
leans Savings Inst., 32 La. Ann. 527 (1880); Winn v. Veal-Winn Co.'s Receiver,
16 La. App. 323, 134 So. 264 (1931).
8. In plaintiffs' petition filed in the trial court in the instant case, no
allegation is made that permission of the Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans had been granted to sue the receiver in St. Mary Parish.
9. Jurisdiction ratione personae relates to "the space or extent of country
over which the judge is entitled to exercise" his judicial power, as distin-
guished from jurisdiction ratione materiae which "means the power of him
who has the right of judging." Art. 76, La. Code of Practice of 1870. See also
Arts. 87-91, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
10. "Jurisdiction implies or imports the power of the court; venue the
place of action." Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N. C. 415, 418, 160 S. E. 481, 482 (1931).
See, to the same effect: National Ass'n of Creditors v. Brown, 147 Wash. 1,
264 Pac. 1005 (1928); Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482, 130 N. E. 177 (1921).
11. Art. 162, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
12. Tripani v. Meraux, 184 La. 66, 165 So. 453 (1936); Rhodes v. Chry-
santhou, 191 La. 774, 186 So. 333 (1939); State v. Younger, 206 La. 1037, 20 So.
(2d) 305 (1944), noted in (1945) 19 Tulane L. Rev. 458, 460.
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these additional exceptions use language definitely permissive,"
while others employ mandatory phraseology. 14 Further, the
increase in the number of the exceptions to the general rule
augmented the possibilities of a case falling within the applica-
tion of two or more of the exceptions.
Heretofore, in cases falling within the application of two
exceptions to the general rule, the court consistently has held
that the plaintiff might bring the suit in the jurisdiction sanc-
tioned by either of the exceptions. 5 In such cases, when one of
the two applicable exceptions was couched in mandatory lan-
guage, in effect the latter has been construed merely as prohibit-
ing the application of the general rule, not as prescribing the
exclusive venue."l Difficulties in the application of the rule of
the instant case are presented with respect to cases falling within
two exceptions to the general rule, both of which are expressed
in mandatory language. Thus, if A and B Corporations are
co-proprietors of immovables situated in X Parish, and a receiver
for the corporation had been appointed in Y Parish, where would
A bring an action to partition the property? If instituted in X
Parish under Article 165 (1), under the instant case the court
would lack jurisdiction, since the mandatory language of Article
165 (3) would require that the suit be brought only in Y Parish.
But should A institute suit in the latter, he would be confronted
with the holding of Mitcham v. Mitcham," that the language of
Article 165 (1) is mandatory, and hence only the court in X
Parish would have jurisdiction to partition the property. Addi-
tional dilemmas are presented by the other possibilities of con-
flict between other exceptions couched in mandatory language.'
13. Art. 165 (6, 9, 10), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by
La. Act 282 of 1940.
14. Art. 165 (7, 8), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by La.
Act 282 of 1940.
15. Williams' Heirs v. Zengel, 117 La. 599, 42 So. 153 (1906); Joseph Rath-
borne Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 164 La. 502, 114 So. 112 (1927).
16. In Williams' Heirs v. Zengel, supra note 15, it was held that under
Art. 163, La. Code of Practice of 1870, a Jactitory action is properly brought
in the parish where the property is situated, even though brought against
the administrator of a succession, who, under Art. 164, should have been
sued in the court conducting the succession proceedings. In Joseph Rath-
borne Lumber Co. v. Cooper, supra note 15, despite the mandatory language
of Art. 165 (8) requiring an action for trespass to real estate to be brought
in the parish where the property is situated, two joint tortfeasors were
permitted to be sued in another parish in which one was domiciled, under
the provisions of Art. 165 (6) permitting solidary obligors to be sued at the
domicile of either.
17. 186 La. 641, 173 So. 132 (1937).
18, These include:
(a) Suit against a partnership having only one establishment and
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Even more unfortunate, however, is the court's affirmance
and extension of the rule of the Mitcham case, holding an excep-
tion to the general rule of suit at defendant's domicile expressed
in mandatory language to constitute a rule of jurisdiction ratione
materiae. Prior to 1937, similar provisions consistently had been
treated as relating only to jurisdiction ratione personae." The
same dilemmas in the application of this principle are presented
by a case falling within two of these exceptions as set forth
above. Further difficulties are encountered in attempting to
determine the limits which the court in the future will place
upon a projection of the rule of the instant case and Mitcham v.
Mitcham. The line of demarcation will have to be drawn some-
where as any complete, logical extension of the rule of these
cases will lead to absurd consequences. Even the general rule
of suit at the defendant's domicile is couched in mandatory
language,20 a fact which doubtless escaped the attention of the
court in the principal case.
The instant case, and even more so the possible analogical
extensions thereof, may raise questions as to the validity of titles
deraigned through judicial proceedings based upon the earlier
cases. These facts, together with the present unsettled state of
this phase of Louisiana procedure, argue strongly for a return
that in X Parish (Art. 165 (2)) to recover for trespass to real estate
situated in Y Parish (Art. 165 (8)).
(b) Suit against a succession opened in X Parish (Art. 164) to recover
for trespass to real estate situated in Y Parish (Art. 165 (8)).
(c) Suit against an insolvent corporation for whom a receiver had
been appointed in X Parish (Art. 165 (3)) to recover for trespass to real
estate in Y Parish (Art. 165 (8)).
(d) Suit against a succession opened in X Parish (Art. 164) for a par-
tition of real estate situated in Y Parish (Art. 165 (1)), owned jointly
by plaintiff and decedent.
(e) Suit to recover on bond of officer of X Parish (Art. 165 (7)) against
deceased surety whose succession has been opened in Y Parish (Art.
164).
(f) Suit to recover on bond of officer of X Parish (Art. 165 (7)) against
defunct Louisiana surety company for which a receiver has been ap-
pointed in Y Parish (Art. 165 (3)).
Additional clashes between provisions couched In mandatory language
may be afforded in actions of boundary affecting real property in X
Parish (Art. 840, La. Civil Code of 1870), brought against a succession
opened in Y Parish (Art. 164), or an insolvent corporation for which a
receiver has been appointed in Y Parish (Art. 165 (3)).
19. See cases cited supra note 15.
20. Unless falling within one of the exceptions expressly provided for by
law, a defendant "must be sued before his own judge, that is to say, before
the judge having jurisdiction over the place where he has his domicil or
residence .. " Art. 162, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Cf. Art. 93, La. Code
of Practice of 1870.
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to the former jurisprudence. Perhaps timely and complete relief
can be obtained only through a legislative restatement of the
pertinent code provisions. CECIL C. LowE
MARRIAGE-CAPACITY OF MINORS TO MARRY-MIn uIM AGE-
A fifteen year old girl married without parental consent and
remained away from home four days. Her parents filed a petition
in the juvenile court alleging that the child was delinquent in
that she had absented herself from her home and her parents
without their consent. She was placed in a convent by the
juvenile court judge and was denied bail pending a hearing
on the complaint. Upon her application and that of her husband
to the supreme court, a rule was issued ordering the judge to
show cause why she should not be released from custody. The
judge responded that the marriage was illegal under Article 92,1
which forbids celebrants of marriages to marry females under
the age of sixteen or males under the age of eighteen. The
supreme court rejected the reasoning and interpreted the article
literally as a prohibition on celebrants only, and not as a declara-
tion of the minimum age for marriage. The court also relied on
Article 1122 which provides that a marriage cannot be annulled
for lack of parental consent and accordingly held that it was not
only the wife's right, but her duty to live with her husband.
State v. Golden, 210 La. 347, 26 So. (2d) 837 (La. 1946).
Thus for the first time in Louisiana we have a decision by
the supreme court on the validity of a marriage in which the
celebrant violated ,the provisions of Article 92. This decision was
affirmed by implication in the case of State v. Priest," decided
eighteen days later.
1. La. Civil Code of 1870 as amended by Act 140 of 1934: "Ministers of
the gospel and magistrates, entrusted with the power of celebrating mar-
riages, are prohibited to marry any male under the age of eighteen years,
and any female under the age of sixteen, and if any of them are convicted
of having married such persons, he shall be removed from his office, if a
magistrate, or deprived forever of the right of celebrating marriage, if a
minister of the gospel." Before the 1934 amendment the ages were fourteen
and twelve respectively.
2. La. Civil Code of 1870: "The marriage of minors, contracted without
the consent of the father and mother, can not for that cause be annulled,
if It Is otherwise contracted with the formalities prescribed by law; but
such want of consent shall be a good cause for the father and mother to
disinherit their children thus married, If they think proper."
3. 27 So.(2d) 173 (La. 1946). A fifteen year old married woman was com-
mitted to the State Industrial School for Girls by the Juvenile court judge
for truancy from school. The court cited the case here noted and held a
fifteen year old married woman was not a child under the care and control
of parent, guardian, or other person within the statute providing that such
[VOL. VII
